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Abstract
This paper computes the steady-state optimal rate of inflation assuming two different sticky-price
specifications, Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980), in a model with monopolistic competition. The optimal
rate of inflation in steady state is always positive. This result is robust to changes in the degree of
price stickiness. In both cases of staggered prices, the optimal rate of inflation is approximately equal
to the ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to calculate the optimal rate of inflation in economies with monopo-
listic competition and sticky prices. On that purpose, two types of slow price-adjustment specifications
will be introduced in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive framework: the Taylor (1980) stag-
gered prices, and the Calvo (1983) partial adjustment based on fixed probabilities. Together they
represent the bulk of recent literature on optimizing models with sticky prices.1, 2
We compute the optimal monetary policy by finding the inflation rate that maximizes welfare in
steady state. Intuitively, our optimality analysis is based on the steady-state link between inflation
and the mark-up of prices over the marginal cost of production. This mark-up is recognized as a source
of economic inefficiency that stems from monopolistic competition models.3 Therefore, the rate of
inflation that maximizes the utility of the representative individual in the economy is also the one that
IAsier Aguilera-Bravo gratefully acknowledges financial support from Fundacio´n Banco Sabadell, Fundacio´n Ban-
caria Caja Navarra and Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra. Miguel Casares would like to acknowledge financial sup-
port from the Spanish government (research project ECO2015-64330-P). Corresponding author: Asier Aguilera-Bravo
(asier.aguilera@unavarra.es)
1Examples of papers using Calvo model are Yun (1996), King and Wolman (1996), Erceg et al. (2000), and Sbordone
(2002). The Taylor model has been employed by in King and Wolman (1999), Chari et al. (2000), and Huang and Liu
(2002).
2One alternative way of introducing price rigidity in models with monopolistic competition is by assuming an
adjustment cost of price changes as in Rotemberg (1982). One example is Faia (2008), who also computes the optimal
monetary policy and finds similar results to the ones obtained in this paper.
3It results in some welfare loss relative to the price-taking behavior of perfect competition as first pointed out by
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Other papers that examine this issue are King and Wolman (1996, 1999) and Khan
et al. (2003).
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minimizes the mark-up in steady state. This becomes the optimal rate of inflation when abstracting
from other channels for long-run effects. Neither price indexation nor transactions-facilitating money
(shoe-leather costs) will feature in the analysis in order to isolate the steady-state effects of combining
monopolistic competition with sticky prices.4 These assumptions may be acceptable in economies
with low and stable inflation.5
We find that the optimal rate of inflation in steady state is positive because it reduces the monop-
olistic competition distortions, minimizing the mark-up and hence maximizing welfare. This result is
robust for different schemes and degrees of price stickiness. Moreover, the optimal rate of inflation is
approximately equal to the ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity.
Finally, we document that even though the welfare cost of steady-state inflation is quantitatively
small, it is significantly higher if prices are sticky a` la Calvo than a` la Taylor.
2. A MODEL WITH MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND STICKY PRICES
2.1. Households
There is a representative household in the economy who, in period t, seeks to maximize his expected
intertemporal constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility given by:
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
c1−σt+j
1− σ − ϕ
n1+γt+j
1 + γ
)
where Et is the rational expectation operator in period t, β = 1/(1 + ρ) is the discount factor, with
ρ > 0 as the household discount rate. The preference parameters are strictly positive, σ, γ, ϕ > 0.
Household utility depends positively on consumption, ct+j , and negatively on labor, nt+j .
6 The
household faces a sequence of flow budget constraints which, denoted in real terms for a given period
t, can be written as:
wtnt + r
k
t kt + dt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ) kt + (1 + rt)−1 bt+1 − bt
where kt+1 and bt+1 denote purchases of physical capital and bonds, respectively, and 0 < δ < 1 is
the constant rate of capital depreciation. Accordingly, rkt and rt are the real returns on capital and
bonds. The real wage is wt, and dt are firm dividends.
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to consumption, bonds, physical capital and labor
4See Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lucas (2000), and Khan et al. (2003) for the welfare analysis of inflation in models
with transactions-facilitating money, and Casares (2004) when there is price indexation.
5From 1995 to 2018, the average rate of inflation in the US has been 1.89% per year, whereas in the Euro Area it
has been 1.53% per year.
6The household actually consumes a bundle of differentiated goods, i.e. ct =
[∫ 1
0 ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
.
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supply are
c−σt − λt = 0
−λt (1 + rt)−1 + βEtλt+1 = 0
−λt + βEtλt+1(1− δ + rkt+1) = 0
−ϕnγt + λtwt = 0
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.
2.2. Producers
We begin with the monopolistic competition setup described in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There
is a continuum of firms each producing a differentiated good and selling it in a monopolistically
competitive market. Thus, the firm i sets the price Pt(i) in quarter t, and the amount of output that
will sell yt(i) is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz demand equation
yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
yt,
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, Pt is the aggregate price
level, and yt is aggregate output. Regardless of the price-adjustment specification, in every period
firms choose capital and labor to minimize the cost of production:
rkt kt(i) + wtnt(i)
subject to the Cobb-Douglas production technology
kαt (i)n
1−α
t (i) = yt(i)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the capital elasticity with respect to output. The first-order necessary conditions
with respect to capital and labor are
rkt −mct(i)α
(
kt(i)
nt(i)
)α−1
= 0 (1)
wt −mct(i)(1− α)
(
kt(i)
nt(i)
)
= 0 (2)
where mct(i) is the Lagrange multiplier of the technological constraint which coincides with the firm-
level real marginal cost. Combining both (1) and (2), we obtain the capital-labor ratio for firm i
kt(i)
nt(i)
=
α
1− α
wt
rkt
3
Notice that every firm has the same capital-labor ratio, which implies that the real marginal cost is
also the same across firms and is given by
mct =
(
wt
1− α
)1−α(
rkt
α
)α
Next, we will introduce two different price-adjustment schemes.
2.2.1. Optimal Price Under Calvo Scheme
Following Calvo (1983), let us assume that, in every period, there is a constant probability, 0 <
η < 1, that firms will not be able to change prices. If the reresentative firm i receives the Calvo signal
to set the optimal price, the decision is made by maximizing the intertemporal profit function:
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjηj
[(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)1−θ
yt+j −mct+j
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)−θ
yt+j
]
The first order condition for the price Pt (i) is:
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjηj
[
(1− θ)
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)1−θ
1
Pt+j
yt+j + θmct+j
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)−θ−1
1
Pt+j
yt+j
]
= 0 (3)
After some algebra, equation (3) can be solved for the optimal price which, in a steady state, with a
constant rate of inflation pi, is given by7
P (i) =
θ
θ − 1
[
1− βη(1 + pi)θ−1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ
]
Pmc (4)
2.2.2. Optimal Price Under Taylor Scheme
Alternatively, it could be assumed that firms adjust the price with a constant frequency as proposed
by Taylor (1980). In particular, firms decide new prices every J quarters, remaining unchanged
meanwhile. Hence, the optimal-price decision for the representative firm is made by maximizing the
intertemporal profit function:
Et
J−1∑
j=0
βj
[(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)1−θ
yt+j −mct+j
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)−θ
yt+j
]
The first order condition for Pt (i) is:
Et
J−1∑
j=0
βj
[
(1− θ)
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)1−θ
1
Pt+j
yt+j + θmct+j
(
Pt (i)
Pt+j
)−θ−1
1
Pt+j
yt+j
]
= 0
7Variables with no time subscript indicate their value in steady state.
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As in the previous case, this equation can be solved for the optimal price which, in a steady state
with constant inflation is given by
P (i) =
θ
θ − 1
[
1− βJ(1 + pi)Jθ
1− βJ(1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− β(1 + pi)θ−1
1− β(1 + pi)θ
]
Pmc (5)
3. RESULTS
3.1. Inflation, the Mark-up and the Welfare Cost
The market power that firms have under monopolistic competition produces a positive mark-
up of prices over marginal cost. This mark-up creates an inefficient wedge between the marginal
productivities of capital and labor and their corresponding marginal payments, i.e. the real wage, w,
and the real rental rate on capital, rk, respectively.8 Consequently, the equilibrium levels of capital and
labor, and hence output, under monopolistic competition are lower than in an economy with perfect
competition. Therefore, a higher mark-up implies a lower output produced in the economy. This
distortion, whose presence is solely stemming from monopolistic competition, is what motivates the
search for policies that monetary and fiscal authorities could use to reduce the mark-up and, therefore,
improve the aggregate economic activity. In particular, in this paper we look for the (constant) steady-
state inflation rate that maximizes welfare.9 Not surprisingly, this is equivalent to finding the inflation
rate that minimizes the mark-up. Hence, in the following, an analysis of the effects that steady-state
inflation has on the mark-up, and subsequently on welfare, will be carried out.
Even though the presence of a positive mark-up is independent from the existence of sticky prices,
its size actually depends on both the scheme and degree of price stickiness. By looking at equations
(4) and (5), we notice that the optimal price is equal to the product of the firm-level mark-up and
the nominal marginal cost. In turn, the firm-level mark-up can be decomposed into its constant
component θ/(θ− 1), and a model-specific component that depends on the price stickiness parameter
(η and J , respectively in the Calvo and Taylor specifications). In both variants, the firm-level mark-up
is increasing in inflation. This seems intuitive, if there is positive inflation the firms that have the
opportunity to adjust their price will increase it.
If we multiply both sides of equations (4) and (5) by P/P (i), we find the aggregate price as a
proportion, µ, of the nominal marginal cost: P = µPmc. Therefore, µ is the average mark-up, which
with Calvo sticky prices is
µ =
θ
θ − 1
[
1− βη(1 + pi)θ−1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ
]
P
P (i)
(6)
8In other words, the real marginal cost in equations (1) and (2) is lower than one.
9This is what King and Wolman (1999) define as the monetary modified golden rule.
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while with Taylor staggered prices becomes
µ =
θ
θ − 1
[
1− βJ(1 + pi)Jθ
1− βJ(1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− β(1 + pi)θ−1
1− β(1 + pi)θ
]
P
P (i)
(7)
Notice that the average mark-up of the economy is the product of the firm-level mark-up and the
inverse of the relative price, P/P (i) which is a good indicator of price dispersion due to the price
stickiness.10 Computing the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz price level, it can be seen that the relationship
between steady-state inflation, pi, and P/P (i), depends on the price-adjustment specification. For
Calvo price stickiness, we obtain
P
P (i)
=
[
1− η
1− η(1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(8)
while for Taylor staggered contracts we have
P
P (i)
=
[
1
J
1− (1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− (1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(9)
In both cases, (8) and (9) show that P/P (i) falls with the inflation rate, pi.
The steady-state relation between the average mark-up and inflation is finally obtained by inserting
equations (8) and (9) into (6) and (7), respectively. This allows us to write down, for both the Calvo
and Taylor cases, the steady-state average mark-up, µ = mc−1, as a function of the Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity parameter θ, the rate of discount ρ (through the discount factor β = (1 + ρ)−1), the level of
price rigidity, either η or J , and the steady-state rate of inflation pi
µ =
θ
θ − 1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ−1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ
[
1− η
1− η(1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(10)
µ =
θ
θ − 1
1− βJ(1 + pi)Jθ
1− βJ(1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− β(1 + pi)θ−1
1− β(1 + pi)θ
[
1
J
1− (1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− (1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(11)
As we just discussed, steady-state inflation has opposing effects on the average mark-up of the economy.
On one hand, higher inflation leads to a higher firm-level mark-up, which increases the average mark-
up. On the other hand, higher inflation leads to higher price dispersion (lower P/P (i)), which decreases
the average mark-up. Our numerical simulations have found that the latter effect dominates over the
former effect because the mark-up falls as the steady-state rate of inflation marginally rises from
0%. Therefore, the rate of inflation that minimizes the mark-up is slightly positive. Actually, we have
checked that the rate of inflation that minimizes the mark-up is also the rate of inflation that maximizes
10If P/P (I) is different from one, there is price dispersion. With positive steady-state inflation, pi > 0, the value of
P/P (I) is lower than one. With negative steady-state inflation, pi < 0, the value of P/P (I) is greater than one.
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both output and household utility (welfare). Hence, the optimal steady-state rate of inflation is not
0%, it is a small positive number.
Figure 1: Welfare Cost of Steady-State Inflation, % of Output
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Let us calibrate the parameters of the model and provide some numerical results. We assume that
each period represents a quarter. In the baseline calibration, we set ρ = 0.005, so that the annual
rate of discount is equal to 2%, and θ = 6, which implies a mark-up of prices over the marginal cost
approximately equal to 20%. Table 1 contains the calibration for the remaining parameters, borrowing
usual values taken in the related literature. For comparative purposes, let the degree of price stickiness
under Calvo and Taylor schemes (parameterized by η and J , respectively) be the same. Hence, Q
denotes the average number of quarters without price adjustment. Thus the cases η = [0.5, 0.75, 0.875]
and J = [2, 4, 8] represent three situations for both pricing specifications in which Q is two quarters
(half a year), four quarters (one year) and eight quarters (two years).11
Figure 1 displays the optimal steady-state rate of inflation as the value that minimizes the wel-
fare cost. The welfare cost is measured as the percent of output that represents the consumption
equivalence, i.e. the required increase in the amount of consumption to reach the maximum household
11Note that under Calvo pricing, Q = (1− η)−1, whereas under Taylor pricing Q = J .
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Description
ρ 0.005 Discount rate
θ 6 Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticity
σ 1.25 Risk Aversion
γ 2 Labor elasticity
ϕ 0.55 Labor Disutility
α 0.36 Capital Share
δ 0.025 Capital Depreciation Rate
η 0.75 Calvo Stickiness
J 4 Taylor Stickiness
utility (welfare) obtained at the optimal inflation rate. These welfare costs are displayed in Figure
1 for different values of steady-state inflation (ranging from -1% to 1.5% in annualized terms), for
both pricing schemes and for several degrees of price rigidity. Remarkably, all the sticky-price speci-
fications give a minimum welfare cost of inflation at a steady-state rate of inflation between 0% and
0.5%, closer to 0.5% than to 0%. It means that neither the Chicago rule (−400 ρ1−ρ ≈ −2%) nor the
0% rate of inflation are optimal. The numerical solution of the model indicates that the optimal rate
of inflation is very close to 0.33% for the three different levels of price stickiness (Q=2, Q=4, Q=8),
with Calvo pricing as well as Taylor pricing. Therefore, the degree of price stickiness in either model
has very little effect on the optimal rate of inflation in steady state.12 However, both the type and
the degree of price stickiness crucially determine the size of the welfare cost of inflation. With Calvo
staggered prices the welfare losses are clearly larger than with Taylor prices because the mark-up
increases much more rapidly when steady-state inflation moves from its optimal value.13 In addition,
the longer the average time without adjusting prices (Q), the larger the welfare cost is when inflation
deviates from the optimal rate. Table 2 reports the welfare costs of 2%, 5% and 10% annual inflation
in both specifications:
Table 2: Welfare Cost of Steady-State Inflation (Additional Results)
pi(%) Calvo Taylor
-1 0.0095 0.0010
0 0.0006 0.0001
2 0.0177 0.0016
5 0.1737 0.0129
10 1.2001 0.0545
12This seems surprising because the steady-state relationships (10) and (11), include the price stickiness parameters
η and J . Furthermore, these equations look significantly different yet yield nearly the same optimal rate of inflation.
13The same result has been found by Kiley (2002).
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3.2. Staggered Prices and the Optimal Steady-State Inflation
After showing that the optimal rate of inflation in steady-state is robust to both different pricing
schemes and different degrees of price stickiness, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for alternative
calibrations of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity, θ, and the rate of discount, ρ. Our objective is to check
whether the result found in the previous section holds for different values of these key parameters.
Figure 2: Optimal Steady-State Rate of Inflation (annualized, %) depending on ρ and θ
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Figure 2 plots the optimal rate of inflation, in both the Calvo and Taylor specifications, for a
reasonable range of values of θ and ρ. It is straightforward to notice that both graphs are almost
identical to each other, which supports the fact that the optimal inflation rate is independent from
the pricing scheme for any value on the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity, θ, and the rate of discount, ρ. Also,
it can be noticed that either higher discount rates or lower values of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity
(i.e. higher monopolistic power) lead to a higher optimal rate of inflation. However, Figure 2 does
not provide any information about how the degree of price stickiness influences the optimal rate of
inflation. To overcome this, Table 3 reports the optimal inflation rates for the combinations of cases
with θ = [4, 6, 10] and ρ = [0.005, 0.01], for the Calvo and Taylor specifications and different degrees
of price stickiness.
By looking at Table 3, we can conclude that once ρ and θ are set, not only the sticky-price
specification (either a´ la Calvo or a´ la Taylor) does not matter for the optimal rate of inflation but
also that both schemes provide very similar numbers for any degree of price stickiness, Q. There is
just one minor difference. The Calvo pricing seems to give slightly higher rates of inflation than the
Taylor one, especially when there is great price stickiness (see the cases with Q=8). However, the
difference is quantitatively very small.
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Table 3: Optimal Annual Rates of Inflation (%) for Different Sticky-Price Specifications
ρ = 0.005 and θ = 4 ρ = 0.005 and θ = 6 ρ = 0.005 and θ = 10
Calvo Taylor 400ρθ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ
Q=2 0.5015 0.4974 0.5000 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=4 0.5055 0.4974 0.5000 0.3373 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=8 0.5135 0.4974 0.5000 0.3413 0.3333 0.3333 0.2052 0.2012 0.2000
ρ = 0.01 and θ = 4 ρ = 0.01 and θ = 6 ρ = 0.01 and θ = 10
Calvo Taylor 400ρθ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ
Q=2 1.0060 0.9979 1.0000 0.6736 0.6656 0.6666 0.4054 0.3973 0.4000
Q=4 1.0220 0.9979 1.0000 0.6816 0.6656 0.6666 0.4094 0.3973 0.4000
Q=8 1.0540 0.9979 1.0000 0.7057 0.6656 0.6666 0.4254 0.3973 0.4000
An additional remarkable result is that the optimal rate of inflation can be fairly well approximated
by the ratio 400ρθ . Thus, the ratio of the annualized rate of discount (400ρ) over the Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity (θ) provides a very accurate approximation to the annual rate of inflation that would max-
imize welfare in steady state. Consequently, doubling the discount rate approximately doubles the
optimal rate of inflation.
Summarizing, the optimal steady state rate of inflation is a slightly positive number, which is
not determined by the price-adjustment scheme or the degree of price stickiness. Rather, it is well
characterized by the ratio between two of the model parameters, the discount rate (ρ) in the numerator,
and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity (θ) in the denominator.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have computed the welfare-maximizing rate of inflation in the steady state of a
monopolistic competition model under two different sticky-price specifications: the Calvo (1983) fixed
probability and Taylor (1980) staggered contracts. The maximum welfare is obtained at a steady-
state rate of inflation that leads to the minimum mark-up. This optimal rate of inflation is a positive
number. Furthermore, its value is fairly well represented by the ratio between the annual rate of
discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. This result is remarkably robust to changes in either the
pricing scheme or the level of price stickiness.
The welfare cost of steady-state inflation is rather small. In the baseline calibration with ρ = 0.005
and θ = 6, the welfare cost of a 5% annual steady-state inflation is a permanent 0.17% of output with
Calvo pricing and just 0.013% with Taylor contracts.
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APPENDIX
Steady State Equilibrium Conditions
We have a system of 10 equations for 10 endogenous variables (c, k, r, rk, b, w, n, y, mc, µ).
• Overall Resources Constraint
y = c+ δk − r
1 + r
b (12)
• Euler Equation
1 = β(1 + r) (13)
• No arbitrage
r = rk − δ (14)
• Labor supply
ϕnγ = c−σw (15)
• Bond supply
b = 0 (16)
• Output
y = kαn1−α (17)
• Marginal cost
mc =
(
w
1− α
)1−α(
rk
α
)α
(18)
• Capital-labor ratio
w
rk
=
1− α
α
k
n
(19)
• Mark-up
µ = mc−1 (20)
• Optimal pricing with either Calvo sticky prices
µ =
θ
θ − 1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ−1
1− βη(1 + pi)θ
[
1− η
1− η(1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(21)
or Taylor staggered prices
µ =
θ
θ − 1
1− βJ(1 + pi)Jθ
1− βJ(1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− β(1 + pi)θ−1
1− β(1 + pi)θ
[
1
J
1− (1 + pi)J(θ−1)
1− (1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
1−θ
(22)
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